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The exceptional youth-led wave of anti-authoritarian 
protests in several Arab countries in 2010-2011, re-
focused the world’s attention on Arab youth. In par-
ticular, the rapid and unexpected mass mobilisa-
tions, anticipated by the development of youth-
based activist groups in the last decade and the 
spread of new communication technologies, brought 
to the fore the idea of youth as the engine for long-
needed change in the region. 
The recent negative, if not dramatic, course of events 
in most countries of the Arab region, should not divert 
our attention from the fact that youth can, and indeed 
should, represent “a force of cultural and social regen-
eration.”1 However, due to the severe political, eco-
nomic and social conditions regarding youth exclusion 
in the region, this potential can only be realised through 
a transformation of the systemic inequalities that lead 
to exclusion in the first place. This can only happen 
through collective, bottom-up and long-term process-
es whereby young people gain by themselves the abil-
ity, authority and agency to implement change in their 
own life and in the life of society at large or, in other 
words, through processes of youth empowerment.
Youth Empowerment as a Collective and 
Bottom-Up Process
Empowerment is a widely used concept, but also 
one that is difficult to define and use correctly. As 
can be derived from the composition of the word it-
self, the concept has to do with the issue of power 
and implies a change in power relations. Youth em-
powerment should imply an expansion of the ability 
to make strategic life choices in a situation in which 
that ability was previously denied, as much as it 
should imply a challenge and a destabilisation of un-
equal power relations through a transformative pro-
cess. 
However, in a context in which dominant norms and 
cultural values strongly limit the ability of young peo-
ple to make strategic life choices, structural con-
straints cannot be addressed by individuals alone. 
Young individuals can and do act against dominant 
norms, but their impact on the general situation of 
youth is limited and they might pay a high price for 
their autonomy. The process of youth empowerment 
depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, 
as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. 
Youth organisations and social movements thus 
have an important role to play in creating the condi-
tions for change and in reducing the costs of indi-
vidual action.2
Understanding youth empowerment as a transfor-
mation process of existing exclusionary power rela-
tions implies that it can only be brought about 
through a bottom-up process rather than a top-
down strategy. To deal with social exclusion, young 
people cannot be ‘empowered’, but they must em-
power themselves through forms of agency, al-
though the pre-conditions for this to take place 
could depend on structural factors or even be fa-
cilitated by top-down policies. For instance, giving 
young people access to better education is unlikely 
to be automatically empowering, but it creates a 
1 Herrera, Linda. “Youth and Generational Renewal in the Middle East.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 3 (2009), p. 368.
2 Adapted from Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurements of Women’s Empowerment.” Development 
and Change 30 (1999), p. 457.
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favourable factor for creating the pre-condition for 
youth empowerment (such as a more critical con-
sciousness). Youth empowerment is also an open-
ended process and cannot be predicted at its out-
set without running the risk of violating its essence, 
which is to enhance young people’s capacity for 
self-determination. 
The process of youth empowerment 
depends on collective solidarity in 
the public arena, as well as individual 
assertiveness in the private one. 
Youth organisations and social 
movements thus have an important 
role to play in creating the conditions 
for change and in reducing the costs 
of individual action
It is, furthermore, critical to recognise youth as a di-
versified category. The expressions, ideas and expe-
riences of being young vary across cultures, classes, 
genders, ethnicities and other groupings. Young 
people from different social strata experience impor-
tant social changes in different ways, and have dif-
ferent needs and demands. However, while it is true 
that young people cannot be considered a single 
homogeneous category, it is equally true that school-
ing, mass media, urban spaces (public parks, shop-
ping malls) and new information technologies have 
played a crucial role in developing a particular con-
sciousness about being young, which facilitates mu-
tual influence and peer interactions.3 Moreover, 
youth in Arab countries from almost all social classes 
have been confronted with an increasingly problem-
atic transition into adulthood owing to economic, 
political and social failures of the system created by 
the older generation. This means that being young in 
the Arab region today is more than a biological at-
tribute: it is the consciousness of a shared experi-
ence of exclusion determined by the failure of post-
independence development models.4
More in general, and beyond the Arab region, certain 
conditions of the contemporary period have contrib-
uted to creating a distinct global political youth cul-
ture, thus increasing youth self-awareness and the 
chances for collective youth agency. For example, 
new forms of horizontal youth political involvement 
unmediated by the older generation (social move-
ments vs. the youth section of traditional political 
parties) and new technologies mastered by youth 
(with young people playing a larger role than in the 
past in teaching and acquainting the older genera-
tion with new technologies and cultural patterns as-
sociated with globalisation) have opened up new 
avenues of active political, economic and socio-cul-
tural participation for the current generation. 
The 2011 uprisings that led to the overthrow of Ben 
Ali and Mubarak and seriously challenged other re-
gimes in the region are a testimony that youth collec-
tive agency has today a great potential in transform-
ing existing power relations, although its impact may 
be subtle, long-term and often unintended. During 
the decade prior to the uprisings, youth collective 
agency in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the re-
gion, brought about broad cultural transformations 
by affecting values, symbols and political cultures 
and challenged many of the dominant ideas that 
sustained the power structure of authoritarian re-
gimes, such as hereditary rule, police brutality, emer-
gency law and corruption. 
Within political parties and organisations, a genera-
tion of young activists started to openly dissent from 
the old conservative leadership and to develop a 
more critical and less subordinate culture vis-à-vis 
the older generation (the young bloggers within the 
Muslim Brotherhood; Youth for Change within Ki-
faya). Young women activists also started to gradu-
ally shift the boundaries of acceptable public behav-
iour for their group, thus transforming power relations 
both within family and youth groups (for example, a 
young woman, Israa Abdel-Fattah was the co-found-
er of the April 6 Movement). In Tunisia, in 2006, un-
employed graduates established the Union des 
Diplômés Chômeurs (UDC) to denounce their pre-
carious situation. In a few months, the UDC, initially 
tolerated by the regime, was able to establish a 
3 Herrera, Linda and Bayat, Asef (eds.). Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2010.
4 Murphy, Emma. “Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure.” Mediterranean Politics, 17: 1 (2012).
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number of small committees in the most marginal-
ised areas of the country, including Gafsa and Re-
deyef. These committees were at the heart of the 
large protest movement that erupted in the mining 
area of Gafsa in January 2008. The protests, al-
though harshly repressed by police, began to call 
into discussion the prevailing discourse of Tunisia’s 
economic miracle, seriously undermining the legiti-
macy of the Ben Ali regime.5
Largely unnoticed or underestimated by scholars 
and analysts working in the region, these ideas start-
ed to enter the public debate and gained increasing 
legitimacy among the masses, thereby laying the 
groundwork for widespread protests. 
Youth Empowerment as a Nonlinear and 
Long-Term Process
It is also of fundamental importance to consider that, 
like all social processes, youth empowerment is a 
complex, contradictory and long-term process. As 
such, it does not have a linear development: it can 
make significant achievements and also suffer major 
setbacks.
As stated above, the wave of youth-led protests in 
most Arab countries in 2010-11 represented a sig-
nificant challenge to traditional power relations. Not 
only were the security apparatuses taken by surprise 
and, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, temporarily de-
feated by the unexpected and large-scale spontane-
ous mobilisation of millions of people, but also pro-
testors subverted well-established patterns of 
oppositional politics in the region by creating new 
slogans and symbols and by side-stepping tradition-
al opposition parties and organisations, which did 
not have a significant role in promoting and sustain-
ing the uprisings. 
However, shortly after the revolutionary events, it be-
came apparent that the entrenched structure of 
power was much more difficult to eradicate than the 
activists had initially hoped, especially in the ab-
sence of organised revolutionary movements that 
could channel youth energy and demands. This is 
most evident in the case of post-Mubarak Egypt, but 
also in Tunisia, where the voices of youth and par-
ticularly those who inspired the popular uprisings 
have continued to remain unheard in policy decision-
making and also excluded from major political or-
ganisations. In Egypt, all post-uprising authorities 
have governed in a top-down manner without any 
genuine involvement or consultation with youth 
groups, have been reluctant to discard the old sys-
tem of power and have increasingly resorted to re-
pressive tactics such as arrests, intimidation, and 
the use of force to placate youth protests. After the 
first elected President, Mohamed Morsi, was de-
posed, the crackdown on youth activists has intensi-
fied. Prominent activists of the April 6 Youth Move-
ment were sentenced to three years in jail for joining 
the “No Military Trials for Civilians” campaign last 
November against the new protest law, approved by 
President Adly Mansour on 24 November. 
Youth groups who were behind the mass protests 
against authoritarian regimes have been left out of 
emerging institutions and parties, both in Egypt and 
Tunisia, or simply destroyed by the violent turn of 
events in other contexts. For example, in the first par-
liamentary elections after the overthrow of Mubarak 
and Ben Ali, not only did youth groups from tradi-
tional opposition forces play a minor role in setting 
the agenda, but also youth coalitions such as the 
Egyptian Revolution Continues Alliance coalition, 
which included a number of youth groups and activ-
ists that contributed to the fall of Mubarak, took less 
than ten parliamentary seats, while al-Adl Party, an-
other force composed of youth activists, only won 
two seats. Similarly, in Tunisia, despite a number of 
newly formed political parties (e.g., the Mouvement 
des Jeunes Tunisiens Libres and Rencontre Jeunes 
Libres) and independent lists representing youth 
and the unemployed (e.g., the Afkar Mostaquilla 
platform and some members of the Union of Unem-
ployed Graduates) as well as the requirement that at 
least one candidate on each list be under the age of 
30, the Constituent Assembly elected in October 
2011 was unrepresentative of young people. Finally, 
the involvement of a few youth representatives in 
decision-making is likely to reflect the post-uprising 
authorities’ attempts to co-opt young activists into 
5 Allal Amin. “‘Ici, si ça ne ‘bouge’ pas ça n’avance pas !’ Les mobilisations protestataires de l’année 2008 dans la région minière de Gafsa. Ré-
formes néo libérales, clientélismes et contestation,” in Myriam Catusse, Blandine Destremau et Éric VerDier (eds.), L’État face aux débordements 
du social au Maghreb. Formation, travail et protection, Paris, Karthala, (2010).
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the existing system.6 For example, Ahmed Maher, 
leader of the April 6 Youth Movement was member 
of the second Constituent Assembly elected in June 
2012, but later withdrew from the assembly criticis-
ing the slow pace of drafting, the scarce representa-
tiveness of the Assembly and the lack of considera-
tion for proposals made by civil society forces. Much 
worse is the situation in countries where the initial 
peaceful uprisings led to immediate harsh repres-
sion, foreign military interventions or to the escala-
tion of violence and civil war, such as Bahrein, Libya 
or Syria. 
More in general, the transformative potential of 
youth collective agency on the existing power sys-
tem has been weakened over the last three years 
by a number of factors. Youth activism has been 
dispersed in myriad groups and initiatives, scarcely 
coordinated and representing different, albeit not 
necessarily, conflicting demands. Political youth 
groups have suffered from ideological and strategic 
divergences, as well as rivalries and a lack of a 
clear coherent strategy to adopt in the post-upris-
ings era. For example, in Egypt, they were unpre-
pared, divided and confused regarding the best 
strategy to follow ahead of the 19 March Referen-
dum of 2011 and the legislative elections of No-
vember 2011. After the military coup that deposed 
Morsi, youth groups are now even more plagued by 
contrasts and divisions. As it was for the first presi-
dential elections, they have not reached a unified 
consensus on a presidential candidate. The leaders 
of the Tamarrod movement have decided to sup-
port the military and the presidential candidacy of 
Field Marshal General Abdel Fattah Sisi. At the 
same time, the April 6 Movement and others have 
expressed their refusal. The same Tamarrod is now 
plagued by internal divisions, as a number of its ac-
tivists have announced their support for Hamdeh 
Sabahi. Ideological and strategic divergences have 
thus prevented youth groups from elaborating a 
unified and coherent policy vis-à-vis the post-
Mubarak authorities, have diminished their ability to 
influence Egyptian politics beyond street protests 
and have compromised their credibility, causing 
them to lose popular support. In many Arab coun-
tries, the Islamist / non-Islamist ideological divide 
among youth activists, which has deepened in the 
wake of the uprisings, is likely to undermine youth 
collective action. The Tamarrod movement in Egypt, 
for example, has led to similar movements in other 
countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and the Pales-
tinian Territories, raising contrasts among young 
people. In Egypt, the lack of alliance and coopera-
tion between youth groups and independent trade 
unions has also weakened the likelihood of revolu-
tionary forces having a stronger influence on policy 
decision-making. Similarly, in Morocco, the 20 Feb-
ruary Movement and the unemployed graduates 
have failed to cooperate.
However, in the face of the current and well-placed 
widespread pessimism, many observers have un-
derlined the long-term importance of an ‘awakened 
and mobilised society’; one in which a youth com-
ponent that does not passively accept the long-
term authoritarian re-composition of power rela-
tions is crucial. After decades of authoritarianism it 
would be at best naïve to think that bottom-up, 
well-organised and participatory political actors 
could suddenly emerge, or that traditional parties 
and organisation could promptly welcome the ac-
tive participation of young activists. The renewal of 
the dynamics of participation in any context is a 
long and difficult process and could take years or 
even decades to actually have an impact at the 
macro-structural level. 
Nevertheless, the largely unexpected nature of the 
2010-11 mobilisations should teach us a lesson: the 
importance of looking at below-the-radar dynamics 
and processes to understand the prospects for 
change. 
In the last few years, some authors, mainly from the 
field of political sociology, have given new strength 
to promising bottom-up approaches, paying more 
attention to subaltern actors (such as youth) and to 
informal and often unnoticed forms of (political) 
agency.7
6 For example, the young blogger and activist Slim Amamou, who was arrested during the early days of the anti-Ben Ali protests, was appointed 
Secretary of State for Youth and Sport Affairs in January 2011. Probably being aware of the risk of cooptation, Amamou resigned from his cabinet 
post in May 2011. In Egypt, Mahmoud Badr et Mohamed Abdel Aziz from Tamarrod were appointed in Egypt’s 50 member constitution committee 
to modify the 2012 constitution.
7 See for instance: Bayat, Asef, Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009; Beinin, 
Joel and Vairel, Frédéric (eds.). Social Movements, Mobilisation, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press 2011.
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Although the current structural/policy context is un-
favourable to creating the right pre-conditions for 
youth empowerment and young people are excluded 
from political processes, we should not overlook the 
long-term implications of youth agency in challeng-
ing existing power relations. For example, in Tunisia, 
last December, in response to the candidature of old 
personalities to form a new government, a group of 
young Tunisians launched a campaign, “Jeunesse 
Décide” (Youth Decides), on Facebook, calling for 
youth to take part in decision-making. Young people 
posted their candidature to prime minister and their 
CV. Within a few days, many Facebook pages and 
groups were created drawing thousands of follow-
ers. While this campaign did not lead to an immedi-
ate visible success, these young people continue to 
openly challenge the prevailing hierarchical structure 
of power, which is biased against youth. 
More in general, beyond street protests, young activ-
ists and groups in Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab 
countries have been experimenting with new creative 
ways of doing politics and raising public awareness 
of political manipulations, based on transparency 
and participatory democracy. While it is too early to 
gauge the extent to which these forms of youth 
agency will effectively undermine existing power re-
lations, they are likely to generate self-identity, confi-
dence and awareness among those involved. In 
Egypt, with the renewed crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, women, particularly young women, 
seem to be playing a more central role within the 
movement. In November 2013, twenty-one female 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of them 
under the age of 18, were condemned to 11 years in 
prison for taking part in pro-Morsi demonstrations. 
The growing mobilisation of young MB women could 
have an enormous transformative potential: destabi-
lising existing gender relations within the movement; 
enlarging the chances for collective agency among 
young women in a country where the public sphere 
of political activism remains heavily male; and favour-
ing important psychological transformations among 
women from being passive subjects to more active 
agents of self-expression. In the Palestinian Territo-
ries, although most young Palestinians are disillu-
sioned and have abandoned politics, a vibrant, albeit 
small, youth movement has been emerging that is 
challenging not only Israeli occupation but also the 
existing elite, the Palestinian leadership. While the 
movement is faced with many obstacles such as the 
Israeli occupation and oppression by Fatah and Ha-
mas, it bears many similarities to the youth activism 
of the 1980s which eventually led to the First Intifa-
da.8 In addition, as Bayat argued, beyond organised 
collective agency, under repressive contexts, youth 
continue to reclaim their youthfulness and enhance 
their individual lives through dispersed actions and 
with no aim of overthrowing authoritarian regimes.9 
These non-movements of youth, according to Bayat, 
probably became part of the 2011 Arab uprisings 
and merged into a more concerted collective action 
once they were provided with an opportunity. The 
transformative impact of youth activism should then 
be assessed in multiple dimensions, even, and may-
be most of all, below the level of real immediate im-
pact on state policies or institutions. The Arab region 
is rich with forms of political contestation and mobili-
sation – mostly led by youth – which, while not lead-
ing inexorably towards the expansion of civil society 
or democratisation, still have potential for a long-term 
transformative impact on the political culture or on 
forms of participation (although this is less visible). 
For example, as it was mentioned above and as has 
already happened, social movements can bring 
about cultural transformation by affecting values and 
symbols as well as by reshaping public debates to-
wards key political issues. Other kinds of conse-
quences include movement spill-over effects. Social 
movements may indeed have an impact in that they 
inspire other forms of mobilisations. The gains or 
losses made by one movement can have beneficial 
consequences for the demands or the strategies of 
other movements, or their success can encourage 
further mobilisation (e.g. the labour movement vs the 
youth movement as happened in 1968 in the US and 
Europe).
8 Hoigilt, Jacob. “The Palestinian Spring That Was Not: The Youth and Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 35: 4 (Fall) 2013.
9 “Urban Subalterns and the Non-Movements of the Arab Uprisings: An Interview with Asef Bayat.” al-Jadaliyya, 26 March 2013. URL: http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10815/the-urban-subalterns-and-the-non-movements-of-the-
